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Nigeria and Niger Delta

Capital: Abuja
Ethnic Groups: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Ogoni
Official Languages: English
Government: Presidential Federal Republic

The country was named after the Niger River, following an ‘amalgamation’ of then Northern and Southern provinces in 1914. The British authorities carved out three regions with different ethnic compositions and economic patterns in 1939, superseding the North-South divide with a new tripartite administrative structure. Each region had one dominant ethnic group: Hausa-Fulani in the Northern region; Yoruba in the Western Region; and Igbo in the Eastern Region.

A series of constitutions after WWII granted Nigeria greater autonomy until it gained independence as a federation 1 October 1960, with Northerner Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as prime minister. Pre-colonial Nigeria generally saw little relationship between ethnicity and units of government, but ethnic identities strengthened during the colonial period and came to play a substantial role in Nigeria's post-colonial history. Nigeria's first attempt at democracy collapsed in 1966, as a result of political opportunism, ethnic demagoguery and military intrusion.

The Northern-installed military ruler Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon instituted a twelve-state system, six in north, six in south on 27 May 1967. Three days later, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, military governor of the Eastern Region, countered by declaring the secession of the region as the Republic of Biafra. Thus began the civil war which cost over a million lives and which lasted until January 1970, when Biafra surrendered to Federal forces. General Gowon granted general amnesty avoiding probable widespread reprisal killings. Gowon was ousted in the 1975 coup and was succeeded by General Murtala Mohammed, himself assassinated six months later. General Olusegun Obasanjo, who emerged as the new helmsman, held elections and relinquished office in 1979. After a brief spell of civilian rule, military rule returned following a coup led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari sought to punish corrupt office-holders, but his lack of interest in democracy and heavy-handed methods of his security agencies led to another military coup in August 1985, headed by General Ibrahim Babangida.

From the mid-1990s, the country began to witness proliferation of non-state armed groups, pioneered by the Yoruba-self-determination group, the O’odua Peoples Congress (OPC). In the South-East, a surge of crime and insecurity in late 1990s prompted traders in Aba, one of region's biggest market towns, to sponsor the vigilante group "Bakassi Boys". Elsewhere, notably in the Anambra and Imo states, similar groups of young men, contracted to provide private security, soon spiralled out of control or were used by their sponsors as private militias against rivals.

In April 2007, the elections saw the first transition from one civil administration to another, with Umaru Yar'Adua of the ruling People's Democratic Party as president-elect. However, the polling was marred by intense political violence and tension. International observers, local monitors and civil society criticised the outcomes, and the opposition called for new elections.

The Niger Delta

The Niger Delta is an unstable area of Nigeria, and inter-ethnic clashes are common with access to oil revenue often the trigger. Pipelines are regularly vandalized by impoverished residents, who risk their lives to siphon off fuel. Vandalism is estimated to result in thousands of barrels of crude oil wastage every day - a loss to the Nigerian economy of millions of dollars each year. Nigeria is the world's sixth largest oil-producing nation. However, mismanagement and successive military governments have left the country poverty-stricken.

Although many observers think primarily of youths invading oil company properties when they think of conflict there, in fact the roots of South-South conflicts lie deeper in history and in the contemporary social circumstances of the area. Contemporary history of the Delta can be summarized as economic decline and broken promises. Historically, Delta communities prospered as “middlemen” controlling trade with the interior, particularly palm oil products and slaves. But with the development of the colonial state and independence, the region experienced a steady decline and stagnation, for no new sources of wealth developed there to replace these activities. More recently, the failure of the early independent Nigerian government to follow through on a promise to treat the Delta as a special development area, the steady reduction in the share of oil royalties that states in the Delta have received, and, finally, the habitual disregard of state needs by non-indigenous military state governors, continued and worsened Delta problems. The FGRN’s neglect of the Delta’s development (roads, schools, electricity, and health services all ended well inland before reaching coastal communities), Nigeria’s overall economic decline since the mid-1980s, and the tendency of educated Delta youths to leave the area, have confirmed its status as an economic backwater. The people who remained behind simply lacked prospects elsewhere.

The Delta, in part because of its riverine/swamp topography, has historically been politically extremely fragmented, and subject to frequent and at times violent disputes over land and fishing rights, as well as over traditional leaders’ political jurisdictions. These all lead to cycles of “revenge violence.” As more powerful weapons became available in the Delta in the mid- and late-1990s, disputes became more violent. Youth gangs who were willing and able to protect their villages and elders became more powerful. As democratic competition returned in 1998–1999, some of these same youths took up a new line of activity, paid disruption of campaign events, and/or provided candidates protection from such unwanted attentions. Finally, traditional leaders have lost much credibility and respect as they have been corrupted by payments from the military government and the oil companies.

There is an inevitable and serious conflict of interest between Delta communities that bear the environmental damage of oil extraction and the rest of the nation for which oil money is essentially a free good. Delta populations, clearly a minority, regularly lose these struggles. Had they had some authority over environmental issues, many current problems might be more manageable. Lacking this, and given the federal government’s control over all subsurface resources as well as “ownership” of all land, all Delta issues inevitably become national issues. The national government has failed to resolve these.

What is now known as the Nigerian Oil Crisis began on 25 September 2004 when the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) threatened to attack oil facilities and infrastructure in the Delta region. Royal Dutch Shell responded the next day by evacuating 235 personnel from its oil fields. The NDPVF threatened to declare an all-out war against Obasajo’s government on 1 October and told all oil companies and their foreign workers to leave the Delta. Obasanjo entered into negotiations with the group and a ceasefire and disbarment plan were declared on 29 September.
By 5 October, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, the leader of the NDPVF, withdrew from disarmament obligations. The rest of October was punctuated by a series of oil worker strikes and fluctuations in the global price of oil. On 28 October, the NDPVF began to turn its weapons over to the government.

In November, the strikes continued and by the 15th, the government agreed to lower domestic oil prices. The unions suspended their strikes the next day. Unfortunately, fighting began anew when members of the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) attacked the Okrika region. The NDPVF responded by dropping at out disarmament plans. On 30 November, the Nigerian government revealed that over one million barrels of crude oil were lost each week during November.

On 15 June 2005, four Shell workers (two Germans and two Nigerians) were kidnapped. A group calling itself the Iduwini National Movement for Peace and Development claimed responsibility. Three days later, all four workers were released but their kidnappers stated that Shell was still under threat as it had yet to follow through on promises of development in the region.

The situation between the government and the NDPVF worsened when Asari was arrested for treason on 20 September 2005. The next day 300 NDPVF turned out for a protest armed with machetes and promising revenge. On 22 September, over 100 militants stormed an oil pumping station. Threats of more seizures led to another station being closed but government forces were able to reopen both stations by 26 September.

Asari was formally charged with treason on 6 October. If convicted, he could face the death penalty. In what was probably a response to the charges, militants blew up a pipeline and killed eight people in December. As a result of this attack Shell was forced to delay crude shipments out of Nigeria.

In January 2006, a new militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger River Delta (MEND), entered the fray. MEND is closely linked to the NDPVF and is demanding, among other things, the release of Asari and $1.5 billion in compensation from Shell for the pollution they claim it caused. MEND’s first significant act was an attack on Italy’s Eni SpA petroleum company. The deaths of nine Eni officials forced the company to evacuate its staff and contractors from the area. Along with further kidnappings and another withdrawal of Shell workers, it was estimated that the instability had resulted in a 10% drop in Nigerian oil production.

By April, continued attacks had brought Nigerian oil production capability down to 75%. On 5 April, Obasanjo established a special committee to address the crisis by improving education, employment, and infrastructure. By the end of the month, Obasanjo offered the region thousands of new jobs and a highway. MEND’s response came in the form of a car-bombing the next day. Killings and kidnappings of foreign oil workers and the government’s retaliatory attacks continued until December.